Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2008

John F. Fay v. Global Travel Network, Inc., and
Todd Rodgers : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David Maddox; Attorney for Appellee.
James L. Mouritsen; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Fay v. Rodgers, No. 20081012 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1345

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JOHN F. FAY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 2008-1012 CA

vs.
GLOBAL TRAVEL
NETWORK, INC., and TODD
ROGERS,
Defendants and Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT JOHN F. FAY

APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT
COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE ROBERT FAUST,
CASE NO. 06-090014

James L. Mouritsen (USB No. 6117)
170 South Main Street Suite 375
PO Box 992, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
T 801 364-5600
F 801 364-5601
Attorney for John F. Fay
David Maddox
1108 W. South Jordan Pkwy, # A
South Jordan, UT 84095
T 801 446-37881
F801 365-7215
Attorney for Todd Rogers

***** APPELATE
m

COURT*

0 j 2009

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JOHN F. FAY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 2008-1012 CA

vs.
GLOBAL TRAVEL
NETWORK, INC., and TODD
ROGERS,
Defendants and Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT JOHN F. FAY

APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT
COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE ROBERT FAUST,
CASE NO. 06-090014

James L. Mouritsen (USB No. 6117)
170 South Main Street Suite 375
PO Box 992, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
T801 364-5600
F 801 364-5601
Attorney for John F. Fay
David Maddox
1108 W. South Jordan Pkwy, # A
South Jordan, UT 84095
T 801 446-37881
F801 365-7215
Attorney for Todd Rogers

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
JURISDICTION
ISSUES PRESENTED & STANDARD OF REVIEW
STATUTES AND RULES
STATEMENT OF CASE
NATURE OF CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND DISPOSITION
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

iii
v
v
.vii
.vii
vii
x
jrii
xiii

I.

ARGUMENT

A.

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING RULE 11 TO SANCTION
FAY WHERE HE BASED COMPLAINT'S ALLEGATIONS ON
REASONABLE ENQUIRY
1

B.

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPORT ITS
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON RULE 11 SANCTION WITH
SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT AS REQUIRED BY RULE

6

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE AMOUNT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES CLAIMED BY ROGERS WITHOUT
CONSIDERING AN OFFSET FOR THE DOCTRINE OF
AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES

13

C.

D.

1

EXCEPTION TO USUAL DUTY TO MARSHALL EVIDENCE.... 16

CONCLUSION

18

ADDENDUM:
A. MINUTE ENTRY ORDER 4/15/08, B. JUDGMENT 10/07/08
ii

20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Statutes
U.C.A. 78-2-2(3)0)

iv,vi

U.C.A. 78-2-2-4

iv, vi

Utah Rwtes of Appelate Procedure:
Rule 24(a)(9)

17

Rule 42a

iv

Ufah Rules 9f Cfrji PrQc^dure:
Rule 11

1,4,10,11,12

Rule 11(b)(3)

4,10

Rule 11(c)(3)

11

Rule 12 (b)(6)

13

Rule 12 (e)

13

Rule 52a.

vi

Cases:
Anesth. Assoc, v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 852 P.2d 1030 (Utah App. 1993)
Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P2d 772 (Utah 1983)
Armed Forces Ins. v. Harrison, 2003 UT14, 70 P.3d 35.
Barnard v. Sutijf, 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992)
Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 917 (Utah 1993)
Hi

14
14,15
9
vi
1,5

Campbell v. Campbell, 896 PJ2d 635 (Ut. App. 1995)

17

Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380,80 P3d 553

14

Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 VT7S, 985 Y.2& 255

11

John CallEng., Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 795 PJd 678 (UT App. 1990).. .13,14
K.EK. v, T.W. & B.L.W., 2005 UT App 85,110 P.3d 162

11

Mahmood v.Ross, 1999 UT 104,990 P2d 933

14

Madsen v.Murrey & Sons Co.,743 P.2d 1212 (Utah 1987)

14

Morse v.Packer, 1999UTS,973 P.2d422

vi,ll

Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage.., Inc., 872 P.2d 1051 (Ut. App. 1994). .17
Pennington v. Allstate, 973 P2d. 932 (Utah, 1998)

vii

Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577 (Ut. App.1998)

9

Taylor v. Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Ut. App. 1989)

2

Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62 (Utah 1981)

14

Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226,230 (Utah 1997)

11

Young v. Young,979 P2d.338 (Utah 1999)

<

vii

Other Authority:
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 (1981)

14

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 918(1) (1979)

15

SA Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure:
Civil 2d Sec. 1335 (1990)
11

iv

JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated 78-2-2(3)(j). Subsequently, pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2-2-4 and
Rule 42a of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Supreme Court
transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented in this matter include:

I.

Whether the trial court erred in applying Rule 11, U.R.Civ.P. to sanction
Plaintiff John F. Fay, where he based his Complaint's allegations on a
reasonable enquiry. Fay preserved the issues in the trial court by means
of his memoranda and arguments in opposition to defendants' Motion for
Rule 11 Sanctions, his memoranda and arguments in opposition to
Global Travel's Motion for Attorney Fees, and in his memoranda and
arguments in support of his Motion to Amend and For New Trial. See, R.
414,472,494. The standard of review for evaluating the denial or
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions involves a three-tiered approach: (1) the

findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard; (2)
legal conclusions are reviewed under the correction of error standard;
and (3) the type and amount of sanction to be imposed is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard." Morse v. Packer, 1999 UT 5, J 10,973
R2d 422; Barnard v. Sutiff, 846 R2d 1229,1234 (Utah 1992).

Whether the trial court erred in failing to support its conclusions of law
on Rule 11 sanctions with specificfindingsof fact as required by the rule.
The standard of review for evaluating the denial or imposition of Rule 11
sanctions involves a three-tiered approach: "(1) thefindingsof fact are
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard; (2) legal conclusions are
reviewed under the correction of error standard; and (3) the type and
amount of sanction to be imposed is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard." Morse v. Packer, 1999 UT 5, J 10,973 P.2d 422;
Barnard v. Sutiff, 846 P.2d 1229,1234 (Utah 1992).

Whether, even if a sanction was warranted, the trial court erred in
awarding the amount of attorney's fees claimed by Defendant Rogers
without considering an offset for the doctrine of avoidable consequences.
vi

The trial court erred in not making any realfindingson this issue, nor
even addressing the Plaintiff's mitigation of damage claim. R. 479-480,
488-489,516 This is a question of fact-finding. The standard for review
of the factual errors is from a clearly erroneous standard, that the
contested ruling is so lacking in support as to be against clear weight of
the evidence. Rule 52a of U. R. Civ. P., Young v. Young, 979 P2d. 338
(Utah 1999); Pennington v. Allstate, 973 P2d. 932,937 (Utah, 1998).
STATUTES AND RULES
Statutes and rules applicable herein are Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(3)(j),
78-2-2-4, and Rule 11, Rule 12, and Rule 52 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF CASE
A. Nature of Case and Course of Proceedings
1.

Plaintiff John Fay filed a civil lawsuit in the Third District Court alleging
causes of action in bad faith breach of contract andfraud,arising out of a
fraudulent telephone solicitation and a subsequent, breached, settlement
agreement. Record, 1-12.

2.

Defendants Global Travel Network and Todd Rogersfiledan Answer, which
included affirmative defenses of "waiver", "estoppel", "accord and
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satisfaction", "tendered payment", and "failure of plaintiff to mitigate his
damages [emphasis added]", but no motion to dismiss any defendant, nor
motion for a more definite statement, nor any such procedural motion that
would call to the court's attention the belief of one party (Rogers) that he was
not a proper defendant in the action, R. at 13-17.
3.

Fay duly conducted discovery into his claims. During the course of discovery,
the trial court found defendants in default, dismissed defendants, and
sanctioned defendants twice and ordered them to pay Fay's attorney's fees, for
deleterious conduct in refusing to respond to discovery, R. at 120-21,277-78.

4.

Defendants conducted NO discovery into issues relevant to potential defenses,
counterclaims, or oppositions to Fay's claims. See Record.

5.

Approximately one month before the originally scheduled trial date, Rogers
first raised his claim that he was not a proper party defendant, and he
petitioned the court to be dismissed from the case, R. at 308-310.

6.

For unrelated reasons the trial date was continued, and reset to a date
approximately one month after the original trial date. R. 401

7.

The trial court granted Rogers' motion to dismiss approximately one month
before the rescheduled trial date, R. at 377,401.
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8.

The trial court, at defendant's urging, ordered plaintiff to 'elect a remedy' at
trial, so trial proceeded on fraud claims against Global. The court found in
favor of Global. R. 452.

9.

Rogers made a motion for sanctions under U. R. Civ. P. rule 11. R. 404.

10. Global made a motion for attorney fees under statutory and contractual
theories, R. at 458-462.
11. Fay opposed both motions, with affidavits. R. at 426-428,472-481.
12. The trial court granted Rogers' Motion for Sanctions and denied Global's
Motion for Attorney Fees. R. at 514-517.
13. Fay made a motion for new trial and motion to amend, R. at 493-511.
14. Defendants did not file any opposition to Fay's post-trial motions. See Record.
15. The trial court summarily denied Fay's post-trial motions, and entered
Judgment on October 7,2008. R. at 535.
16. Fay filed his Notice of Appeal November 5,2008. R. at 537-538.
B.
1.

Statement of Facts and Disposition
This matter arose out of telemarketing calls in November 2005, in which an
offer of a free trip from representatives of Defendant Global Travel was twice
recorded on Fay's home telephone answering machine, R. at 1-12.
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2.

Fay contacted the number provided to claim his promised trip, and was
informed there would be no free trip, despite the promises, R. at 1-12.

3.

Fay complained to the Utah Attorney General. The Consumer Fraud Division
investigated, and found Global Travel Network guilty of fraud, R. at 1-12.

4.

Through Fay's contact with Utah A.G. office, it presented Todd Rogers as the
figurehead and sole authority for resolution of claims against Global. R. 1-12.

5.

Rogers made contact with Fay by telephone and written correspondence to
discuss settlement of Fay's claims against Global Travel. R. 449

6.

Throughout those discussions Rogers presented himself as Global Travel. Id.

7.

Fay and Rogers arrived at an executory Settlement Agreement, which Rogers
signed "for Global Travel". R. 40,449-451.

8.

Following a long delay in signing the agreement as requested, Rogers,
through his attorney, David Maddox, submitted the agreement, with the date
of his signature backdated, as evidenced by the date arid textual references of
the accompanying fax sheet from Maddox. R. at 373,397-99,430-33.

9.

Fay attempted to rely on the agreement, conducting his duties under it, but
defendants failed and refused to tender payment when due under the
agreement. R. 1-17
x

10. Fayfileda civil suit in Third District Court based on the breach of the
agreement, the fraud in entering the agreement, including the fraud in backdating the signature on the Settlement Agreement, and the fraud in the original
telephone solicitation. R. l,et. seq.
11. Global, through counsel, tendered payment three weeks after suit. R. 13.
12. Rogers' response to the suit was to join in an Answerfiledby counsel. R. 13.
13. Fay presented evidence at trial that Rogers backdated his signature on contract
provision, acting in his personal capacity on behalf of company. R. 449.
14. Fay showed evidence that Rogers held himself out as the company, took
responsibility for fraudulent acts of company agents, and promised to pay Fay
for the company's wrongdoing. R. 494,472
15. Fay presented evidence that counsel for Rogers, David Maddox, told Fay in
writing that Rogers was Global Travel. Rogers made the same written
representations. R. 499,509-511.
16. Fay presented evidence that Utah State Attorney General's office, consumer
fraud division settled code violation action with Rogers acting for Global. R.
449-451.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant John Fay appeals to this Court for review of a Judgment of the Third
District Court, J. Faust, dated October 7,2008, and the related Minute Entry Order
of April 15,2008, from which the Judgment arose. (See Addendum). Fay submits
that the Judgment must fail, as it is reliant on the M.E. of April 15,2008, in which
the trial court improperly uses Rule 11, U.R.Civ.P. to sanction Fay, fails to
adequately find specific facts and state reasons for legal conclusions, and fails to
address the issue plaintiff raised on the doctrine of avoidable consequences. Fay
submits that the 4/15 M.E. is unwarranted on the facts herein, and the Judgment
thatflowedfrom it is void. Fay respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
Judgment and remand this matter to the trial court forfindingsconsistent herewith.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court erred in applying Rule 11 to sanction John Fay. The clear
mandate of Rule 11 requires that a trial court follow strict procedures to find
violation of the rule only in specified limited circumstances. The trial court
here did not follow those procedural guidelines, as set forth in the rule and in

case law interpreting and applying the rule, and applied the rule over-broadly
to sanction John Fay on the facts of this matter.

II. The trial court erred in failing to support its conclusions of law on Rule 11
sanctions with specificfindingsof fact. In failing to properly account for the
bases of it's conclusions of law in the Minute Entry-Order, the court below
failed again to follow the mandates of the rule, and cases interpreting the rule.

III. The trial court erred in accepting the amount of Todd Rogers' alleged attorney
fees in this case as the amount of the "sanction" under Rule 11, in that
awarding the amount of attorney's fees claimed by Defendant Rogers without
offsetting for his failure to mitigate damages following from the litigation, and
withoutfindingfacts or stating conclusions in support of it's refusal to address
the issue, is clear error, and requires reversal of the excessive sanction herein.
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I. ARGUMENT
A. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING RULE 11 TO SANCTION
FAY WHERE HE BASED ALLEGATIONS ON A REASONABLE ENQUIRY
The trial court entered an Order in this matter, referring to Rule 11, U.R.Civ.R, as
authority to sanction Plaintiff John F. Fay for his decision to include Todd Rogers
as a defendant in the lawsuit that givesriseto this appeal. Not only did the trial
court not follow the specific mandates of the rule itself, in reaching to apply the
sanctions allowed by the rule to Fay in this matter, but the court also erred in
erroneously interpreting and applying the standards of application of the rule set
out in decisions of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court.

The Utah Supreme Court, in a case concerning erroneously ordered sanctions,
held, that to avoid sanctions does not require perfect research but rather research
that is "objectively reasonable under all the circumstances. .. .(citation omitted).
In other words, [Plaintiff] Barnard need not have reached the correct conclusion;
he need only have made a reasonable inquiry". Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.
2d 917,920 (Utah 1993). Continuing, the Barnard court found no sanction
warranted where the inquiry is at least "tenable" or "plausible".
Ill
III

1

On the legal standard governing the consideration of Rule 11 sanctions, a panel of
this court stated that:

This rule,
requires some inquiry into both the facts and the law
before the paper is filed; the level cf inquiry is tested against a
standard of reasonableness under the circumstances.
Taylor v. Taylor, 770 R2d 163, at 171 (Ut. App. 1989)
In reviewing Fay's pre-Complaint conduct, the relevant question: was his inquiry
into the facts "reasonable under the circumstances"? is answered affirmatively.
The related question: were his allegations and conclusions at least "tenable" or
"plausible"? is also answered in the affirmative. His pre-litigation inquiry led him
to these facts:
1-

Following Fay's report of fraudulent telemarketing activity, the Utah

Attorney General investigated Defendant Global for fraudulent telemarketing and
fined it. Upon Fay's inquiry that office told him he could deal with Rogers "as
Global" as it had so dealt with Rogers in its investigation. Rogers admitted to the
AG that Global violated the law in its misrepresentations to Fay. Lastly, the AG's
office also told Fay that Rogers signed the AG's office's monetary fine and
punishment findings against Global.
2-

Rogers contacted Fay and represented that he, Rogers was the person who

was responding to Fay for his telemarketing complaints against Global, Rogers
said he would make the "misrepresentations good."
2

3-

Subsequently, Rogers always spoke for Global and entered into a settlement

agreement for Global. During these negotiations, Rogers never said he was not
Global.
4-

At the time of the settlement agreement, Rogers back-dated his signature by

17 days, where the date of his signature was an operative provision of the contract.
5-

During the settlement negotiations and pre-litigation, Rogers wrote Fay a

letter wherein he referred to Global as "my company. "

6-

At or about this same time, Rogers' counsel wrote to Fay, also indicating that

Global was Rogers 'company and that he (Rogers) would satisfy the claim.

See Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion, at 1 to 6, and Fay's Affidavit,
Record at 426-428, the two letters referenced, Record at 499, 509-511.
It is apparent from facts on the record that Fay made a reasonable inquiry, and that
he relied on plausible representations from various sources to the very same point,
that Rogers was Global or, at least, the controlling force behind "Global Travel".

Were Fay's beliefs reasonable under the circumstances? Yes, given that the
representations came from 1- the Attorney Generals' Office which was then

3

investigating Global, and 2- oral representations from Rogers, fo llowed by, 3Rogers' conduct in speaking and negotiating for Global with the Attorney
General's Office, and in 4- Rogers' conduct in speaking and negotiating for Global
with Fay, and in 5- Roger's written representation directly to Fay that Global was
"his company" followed by, 6- Rogers' counsel's written representation to Fay that
Global was Rogers'company Points 1-6 Record at 426-428, 499, 509-511.

Rule 11 requires that: "allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary
support " Sfifi Rule 11(b)(3). Here, the sources Fay relied upon in assessing
whether to sue Rogers were persuasive on the subject, capable of offering
competent evidence if called upon to do so, and further, the three sources related
the very same information, to the effect that Rogers was Global. Finally, and
equally important in this consideration, is the fact that the sources were
independent of Fay and had no self-interest in the assertions. Clearly, Fay's
allegations and other factual contentions had evidentiary support and, certainly,
reliance on the sources met the standard of reasonableness under the
circumstances. Thus, by plain language of Rule 11, sanctions were not warranted.
Cross referencing these facts and the circumstances surrounding the inquiry with
case law interpretation of Rule 11, supra, shows that the law properly rejects any
sanction on the facts here. But the trial court misinterpreted Rule 11.

4

The trial court misapplied the criteria for assessing the reasonableness of Plaintiff's
inquiry. In Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 R2d 917 (Utah 1992), the Utah
Supreme Court found where an allegation or contention is "tenable" or "plausible,"
it does not deserve sanctions. Fay relied upon the Attorney General's office, the
potential defendant, Rogers, and his counsel, which inquiry and resulting reliance
led to allegations in the Complaint that were both "tenable" and "plausible."
In his Motion for Sanctions, Rogers argues that Plaintiff had no facts, nor reason to
sue him, and bases his arguments on seven assertions - but, critically, all seven
assertions were discovered after Fay filed his Complaint. See Defendant's
Statement of Facts Record at 407-408. Fay noted this attempt by Rogers to build
an argument for sanctions on hindsight arguments, in his Opposition to
Defendant's Motion. Record at 419-420. How can Fay be sanctioned for having
no grounds for filing his Complaint against Rogers, based upon arguments that are
supported only by facts discovered after filing the Complaint?

Here, given the consistency of information that Fay's enquiry produced, from
various, reliable sources, including representations by Rogers and his counsel, mat
reflected Rogers to be Global, the trial court'sfindingsare clearly erroneous.
Under the circumstances, Fay's pre-litigation inquiry was objectively reasonable,
and no sanctions are warranted. Fay, therefore, respectfully requests that this

5

Court, on review, find the Order below in error, and reverse and remand the matter
to the trial court for correction.
B.

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPORT ITS
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON RULE 11 SANCTIONS WITH
SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT AS REQUIRED BY THE RULE

The Order entered by the trial court (Addenda), is fatally defective in being
conclusory, where the law mandates specific detail. Appellant here evaluates fatal
deficiencies and erroneous material conclusions in the trial court's Order, seriatim:

1. ''''The courtfindsthat Mr. Rogers is an employee ofDefendant Global Travel
Network". This fact was certainly not apparent to Fay, pre-litigation, but was
discovered long after the Complaint was filed, so cannot be the basis for a sanction
as to Fay's conduct, or knowledge, at the time hefiledthe complaint.

2. "He [Rogers] was involved in resolving the Plaintiffs complaints concerning
Global Travel Network and signed a Settlement Agreement with Plaintiff on behalf
of Global Travel Network". The court, here ignores, however, the uncontested fact
that Rogers back-dated his signature on the settlement agreement, as shown by text
of the documents accompanying delivery of the signed settlement agreement to
Fay, sent by counsel David Maddox. See R. 373,430-433,397-399.

6

3. However, the Court finds that there is absolutely no evidentiary supportfor the
Plaintiff's claims he understood Mr. Rogers to be "Globalfor all intents and
purposes." Indeed it is clear from Plaintiff's opposition and his affidavit that he
understood throughout these proceedings that Mr. Rogers was merely representing
Global Travel Network". Yet, this finding and conclusion is in direct contradiction
to the points in Plaintiffs affidavits. Record at 426-428, 506-508. Fay's affidavit
representations are "tenable" and "plausible".

The first error is the Court's failure to understand that, even if, assuming arguendo,
Fay knew, at the time, that Rogers was merely "representing" Global, this does not
mean or infer that Rogers was simply an employee. In reality, an owner of a
company, an officer or director of a company, could likewise be "representing" the
company and yet still be the "company". Someone, some individual, has to
represent a company, but to represent a company does not compel an
understanding, or impart a belief to others, that the "representative" is only an
employee especially in the face of that individual's representations to the effect that
he is the company.

7

Despite the court's contention, it is not clear that Plaintiff understood throughout
these proceedings that Mr. Rogers was merely representing Global Travel
Network. Plaintiff's affidavit contradicts the court's conclusion in that it attests to:

a.

The Utah Attorney's General's Office told Fay to deal with Rogers. It

did not say Rogers was "only an employee". It only directed Fay to Rogers
in his dealings with Global.
b.

Rogers contacted Fay and represented that he would "make the

[telemarketers'] representations good."
c.

Rogers always represented to Plaintiff that he was "Global."

d.

Rogers back-dated the settlement agreement.

e.

Rogers and his counsel made written representations that Global was

((

Rogers'company." Record at 509-511.

Finally, in this regard, it is crucial to recall that in the Complaint Plaintiff alleged
that he ubelieves Defendant Rogers is a principal of Defendant Global."
Complaint, Record at 2.

4. "In addition, while Plaintiff alleged breach of contract and fraud claims against
Mr. Rogers, the Court can find no evidence to justify the assertion of these claims.
As indicated above, Mr. Rogers was not a party to the contract at issue in this case.
8

In addition, the plaintiff never alleged that Mr. Rogers was the alter ego of Global
Travel Network or otherwise directly benefitedfrom the telemarketer ys alleged
misrepresentations. Simply put, the Plaintiff has never demonstrated a link between
Mr. Rogers and the fraud he alleged in the Complaint or even a reasonable belief
that such a link existed. To the contrary, the Plaintiff clearly had no factual support
for his claims against Mr. Rogers, but nonetheless asserted these claims in the
apparent hope of discovering some down the road". Here the court is only
addressing the telemarketing contact. It simply ignores Rogers' deceit in backdating the settlement contract where the date of his signature was a material
provision of the contract. The court was aware of this deceit. Record at 397-399,
417, 430-433.

Rogers' counsel has agreed that a corporate "officer or director is liable for his own
false representations", citing Armed Forces Ins. v. Harrison, 2003 UT14, 70 P. 3d
35, and again, citing Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577 (Ut. App. 1998) for the
principle that a director is personally liable if he "acts in bad faith or commits a tort
in connection with the performance of his corporate contracts." Record at 410 - 11.
Instantly, when Rogers misrepresented Global as "his company" and when he
back-dated the settlement agreement, he acted in bad faith and committed torts.

9

The trial court misinterprets Rule 11 when it imposes sanction on a finding that
Fay asserted claims against Rogers in the apparent "hope" of discovering some
"factual support down the road". But, Rule 11 (b) (3) provides for allegations and
factual contentions that are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery. Sanctions cannot properly be
premised upon a type of allegation that is specifically permitted by Rule 11.

5. "Overall, it is important to point out that the Court is not dealing with a simple
case of factual errors or misstatements, which are clarified upon reflection or
through the discovery process. Rather, this is a case where the Plaintiff had
absolutely no legal or factual basis for involving Mr Rogers in this action and
asserting claims against him ". Here, the trial court concludes that this is not a
simple case of factual errors and misstatements. But the court does not say why
this is not a case of simple factual errors or misstatements. We are left to guess.
The trial court goes on to state it's unsupported conclusion that Fay had absolutely
no legal or factual basis for involving Mr. Rogers. This is manifest error because
the court had before it Fay's affidavit setting forth several objectively reasonable
grounds why he had reason to sue Rogers. But the court failed to identify why
these grounds were insufficient and why the court maintained the position that Fay
"had absolutely no legal or factual basis for involving Mr. Rogers." How and why

10

devoid of supportive facts or legal reasoning behind the court's leap to resolution.

A panel of this court held, that: uto warrant rule 11 sanctions, factual errors or
mmiatemea '. 'must he significant

[citing] Mm >i \ I'.n in

.'niMll hi S'6 ( (\S' i1 5

R3d 1021 (quoting 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure: Civil 2d Sec. 1335 (1990)) ", K.EK. V.T.W.& B.L. W., 2005 UT
App 85 [4], 110 P.3d 162. But in the matter now before this Court, the trial court's
Order failed

The law demands more than presumptions proffered as facts and legal conclusions
completely void of legal reasoning demonstrating why the sanctioning court
infillM ed nil tilt," t i f f 111 i ill in

We have said that a trial court is required to make explicit findings
of fact in support of its legal conclusions. See Willey v. Willey, 951
R2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997)* This is particularly necessary in the Rule 11 area.
The law requires that a trial court make a series of specific factual findings
as a predicate for concluding that the rule has been violated,
The trial
court's findings and conclusions must reveal the court's reasoning clearly
enough that an appellate court can apply the appropriate standard of review
to each part of the trial court's ruling, Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78 f 101,
985R2d255.

The trial court's Order herein has no explicitfindings of fact in support of its legal
conclusions. It's only two "factual findings" are in the first two sentences; both are
11

undisputed, and together, are much less then the series of specific factual findings
required./*?/* concluding that the rule has been violated. Further, the Order reveals
nothing of the court's reasoning. An appellant, or reviewing court, must guess at
how the trial court reached its conclusions. But, Rule 11 demands that:
When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct
determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the
basis for the sanctions imposed. Rule ll(c )(3) [emphasis added.]
The trial court made two factual "conclusions", totally devoid of any detailed
factual findings. The court then grafted on a host of legal conclusions. But the
legal conclusions, in addition to being legal errors, are devoid of legal analysis.

Had the court engaged in the required factual finding in support of legal analysis,
all explained with specificity required by Rule 11 and case holdings interpreting
the rule, it would have found sanctions are not appropriate in the matter before it.
Thus, thefindingsand conclusions of the Order cannot support Rule 11 sanctions.
Fay submits that this Court should properly reverse the Order of the lower court.

///
///
///
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C. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE AMOUNT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES CLAIMED BY ROGERS WITHOUT
CONSIDERING AN OFFSET FOR THE DOCTRINE OF
AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES

The trial court failed to consider an important legal principle, in awarding the
amount of attorney's fees claimed by Rogers without considering a reduction for
his initial failure to take simple measures to avoid most of the consequences of the
lawsuit of which he complained. Variously called the "doctrine of avoidable
consequences" or "mitigation of damages", the precept has a simple purpose: "to
prevent one against whom a wrong has been committed from recovering any item
of damage arising from the wrongful conduct which could have been avoided or
minimized by reasonable means. [Citation omitted]" John Call Engineering, Inc.
v. Manti City Corp., 795 R2d 678 (UTApp. 1990).

Thus, where Rogers could have, by a simple action, such as a motion to dismiss,
under U.R.Civ.P. Rule 12 (b) (6), or a motion for more definite statement, under
Rule 12 (e), achieved the desired result, of limiting his involvement in the legal
action, it was his affirmative duty to take such action to avoid further harm, and if
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he did not, he cannot complain of the cost to him. The Utah Supreme Court has
stated that:
under the doctrine of avoidable consequences the nonbreaching party has an
active duty to mitigate his damages, and he "may not, either by action or
inaction, aggravate the injury occasioned by the breach." Utah Farm Prod.
Credit Ass'n v. Cox, 627 R2d 62, 64 (Utah 1981); Angelos v. First
Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983); see also Anesthesiologists
Assoc, v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 852 P.2d 1030, 1039 (Utah App. 1993); John
Call Eng'g v. Manti City, 795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah App. 1990); Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 350 (1981).
Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104 [31], 990 P.2d 933.
Further, a panel of this Court, held:
In order to satisfy the duty to mitigate damages, a non-breaching party must
make "reasonable efforts and expenditures." Madsen v. Murrey & Sons Co.,
743 P.2d 1212,1214 (Utah 1987) (quotations and citations omitted);
Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380 [29], 80 P.3d 553.
While many of the cases discuss the issue in terms of contractual relations, and
often refer to the "plaintiff's" duty to mitigate damagesflowingfroma breach, the
logic of the doctrine of avoidable consequences has applied to both plaintiffs and
defendants in property settlements, in marital or business dissolutions, and in other
factual scenarios, and the reasoning is directly applicable to the instant
circumstance of an award of a financial sanction, where the amount of the
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monetary sanction awarded by the trial court is exactly equal to the amount of
attorney fees claimed by the party who alleges damages caused by a legal action.

Rogers could have defended the action, at a significant financial savings, by means
of a simple legal motion at an early stage. The burden is on him, and his counsel,
to do so, and by so doing, limit, or mitigate, his damages and avoid the avoidable
consequences of plaintiff's act. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that:
Under the doctrine of avoidable consequences, "[o]ne need never take steps
in advance to avoid the consequences of a future threatened wrong
rather, need only avoid or minimize damages that - : <
-,K •
has already been committed, t", Mrt^rm^-k Hi,
' Accord
tivstatement (Set YWJ) of Torts § 9}H( I) (1979) (barring recovery of damages
that one could have avoided by reasonable efforts "after" the commission of
the tort). Angelas v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 R2d 772 (UT 1983).

Under these authorities, the "sanction" that the trial

arranted

herein. The court merely adopted, as the monetp
attorney fees claimed by Rogers, withoti( i utisiikitiif1 ,m ullscl m nnlm hm \m iln
doctrine of avoidable consequences,
failing to accept Fay * reqm>( i<
514-16,454-456.

IIMI

did the mini
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uss n s leasoningfor

> i .ider • I• iw ISMI*' .""' V'.1 ' I T1' 1-80,488-9,

It is undisputed that Rogers could simply havefileda motion to explore the option
of terminating his involvement in the lawsuit at a very early stage, and with
minimal expense. Rogers must bear responsibility for failure to take simple,
reasonable measures to mitigate any potential damage following from the wrong he
claims. Fay bears no responsibility for the extent of any such additional exposure
to damage that Rogers allowed himself to accept by failure tofilean appropriate
motion at the earliest opportunity.

Fay respectfully requests that this Court review the Order of the trial court, below,
in light of the doctrine of avoidable consequences, and remand the matter, for
further consideration of an offset against any sanction award to account for the
mitigation Rogers may have made of the damages he alleges.

D.

Exception to Usual Duty To Marshall Evidence

Generally, a party who challenges a fact finding has a duty to marshal all record
evidence that supports the challengedfinding,and then proceed to show why the
evidence, considered in it's entirety, is insufficient to support the judgment. See
16

Rule 24(a)(9), I l<. \pp.l' I his duty has been described as requiring that
"appellate counsel must play the ticvil \ advocate in gathering the evidence in
support of the proposition that the party opposes. See, Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida
Cold Storage & Warehouse, Inc., 872 R2d 1051 (Ut. App. 1994).

But, a critical exception to this usual heavy duty upon the party challenging factual
findings of the trial court, is where the trial court'sfindingsare so inadequate that a
meaningful understanding by the appellate court is impossible. In such a case,
appellant need only show the court'sfindingsas legally insufficient: "appellants
need not engage in a futile marshalling exercise if they can demonstrate the
findings, as framed by the court, are legally insufficient. [Citations omitted]."
Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635 (Ut. App. 1995).

Such is the case here. The trial court'sfindingsare so incomplete, so conclusory,
so lacking in requisite detail, that any effort to marshall the evidence in support of
such limitedfindingswould be futile. Hence, Fay submits that he has met his
burden in challenging the trial court's incompletefindingsof facts.

17

CQNCUJSWN
Plaintiff and Appellant John F. Fay respectfully requests that this Court review the
Order of the Third District Court, the Honorable Robert Faust, dated October 7,
2008. Plaintiff submits that this Judgment and Order is defective in that it fails to
follow the express mandate of Rule 11, U.R.Civ.P., and the controlling authorities
interpreting the rule, where Fay conducted a reasonable inquiry upon which he
based his tenable conclusions and allegations in the Complaint. Further, Fay
submits that the Judgment and Order fails to follow the specific requirement of the
rule and controlling authority by not containing a detailedfindingsof facts upon
which the court may base conclusions of law. Finally, the Court neglected to take
into account, nor explain the absence of reasoning based upon Fay's submitted
arguments relating to avoidable consequences that Rogers may have taken to
minimize his exposure to damages, if any. Therefore, Fay respectfully requests
that this court reverse this Order and, in the alternative, to remand to the trial court
to reconsider the amount, if any, and propriety of sanctions under Rule 11. Finally,
in the event this Courtfinds,and orders, that the trial court erred as urged by Fay,
that Rogers and his counsel are and should be jointly and severally liable to Fay for
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his awls MM;1, iilli n u»'v Irrs associated with prosecuting this appeal, and in
defen»ling against 11•< Motion for Sanctions in the trial court.
SUBMITTI I > llns __.....I... day of April 2009.

Jamej/L. Mouritsen
Attorney for J ^ " F Fay

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I attest that on this
\
day of A p » 2009,1 caused to be delivered, by U.S.
mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of APPELLANT'S OPENING
BRIEF addressed to:
David Maddox
1108 W. South Jordan Pkwy, # A
South Jordan, UT 84095

ES L. MOURITSEN
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
III AMI'" F""\tK' HALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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Defendants
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under Rule '13 ,
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.

determines that the Plaintiff violated

Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of civil Procedure in brining «; 1,-1 11h n^uiii^t
Defendant Todd Rodgers and that sanctions in the form of attorney's fees
and costs are warranted.
The Coin! ! iijij', lint. Mr. Rodgers is an employee of Defendant Global
Travel Network.
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Indeed, it is clear from the Plaintiff's opposition and his

£i davit that he understood throughout these proceedings that Mr.

0c

%ers was merely representing Global Travel Network%
In addition, while the Plaintiff alleged breach of contract and

r

^Ud claims against Mr. Rodgers, the Court can find no evidence to

justify the assertion of these claims. As indicated above, Mr. Rodgers
as
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not a party to the contract at issue in this case. In addition, the
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^avel Network or otherwise directly benefitted from bhe telemarketer's
a
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Simply put,
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Pparent hope of discovering something down the road.^
Overall, it is important to point out that the Court is not dealing
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a simple case of factual errors or misstatements, which are
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case where the Plaintiff had absolutely no legaL or factual basis
involving Mr. Rodgers in this action and asserting claims against
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ROBERT P. FAUST
DISTRICT COURT "
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pan DISTRICT c o m
Third Judicial District
David R. Maddox #2044
8GI" - ? 2008
Attorney for Defendant Todd Rogers
$> q SALT LAKE COUKTY
1108 West South Jordan Parkway, Suite A
South Jordan, Utah 84095
_
„% v"
<*Hitya«*
Telephone: (801) 446-3788
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Facsimile:(801)365-7215
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT
JOHN FAY, an individual,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.
GLOBAL TRAVEL NETWORK, TODD
ROGERS, AND JOHN DOE'S MO,
individuals,

Civil No.: 060900141
Judge: Robert Faust

Defendant.
Was a Defendant Todd Rogers Motion for Summary Judgment came on befoffe the above
entitled Court on the 24fb day of January, 2008. The Court granted defendant Rogers Motion for
Summary Judgment as to the two claims, against defendant Todd Rogers, Trial on this matter was
set for April 2,2008. At that time, the Court awarded attorneys fees in an amount to be determined
after filing an Affidavit of Attorneys Fees on behalf of counsel for defendant Todd Rogers. Having
received said affidavit and memorandum from all parties relating to attorneys fees, the court ruled
on August 21,2008 that as result of legal services rendered by attorney David Maddox, plaintiff
Todd Rogers is entitled to the judgment in the some of $6,301.10.

JD27181181

060900141 FAY.JOHNF

pages: 2

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant Todd Rogers
recover Judgment against plaintiff in the principal amount of $$6,301.10 The Judgment shall bear
interest at the Judgment rate of 6.99% until paid.
DATED this MMay of September, 2008.
BY THE COURT

Judge Robert Faust, District Court Judge.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
and correct copy of the foregoing has been served t h i s / ^day
of August, 2008, by U.S. mail, postage pre-paid, upon the following:
James L. Mourilsen
Gregory & Swapp
2976 W. Executive 1 1 u\\ it m
Lehi, UT 84043

(X ) U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile (801) *>« Ml V>tt\
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